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コーポレート・ガバナンスにおける
会社支配と社外取締役の機能
岩 波 文 孝
Abstract
The spread of corporatization has resulted in the ownership of a compa-
ny being distributed among a large number of shareholders. At the same
time, corporatization has created a divide between the ownership and
management. Since one single owner was not in a position to control an
entire corporation, the situation promoted the impersonal system, under
which ownership and control were separated. Therefore, the debate
over corporate governance was taken up the behavior of publicly traded
corporations. In the process of reforming corporate governance, the role
of a non-executive director or independent director who was responsible
for monitoring a corporation was considered to be important.
In this paper, I will consider the issue of corporate control with refer-
ence to the role of the non-executive directorate on the board. In my
study on corporate governance, I will attempt to consider the function of
the non-executive directorate from an intercorporate perspective.
Keywords: constrained management control, control through a con-
stellation of interests, interlocking directorates
は じ め に
株式の高度な分散による株式会社の大規模化にともなって，株主と経営者
関係あるいは企業とステークホルダー関係からコーポレート・ガバナンス改
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図２ アメリカ最大1000社における個人投資家と機関投資家の株式保有比率
出所）Michael Useem [1996] Investor Capitalism How Money Managers are Changing the































































































































































（literal control） （active power） （取締役を含む最高経営幹部）
制約力 潜在的権能 社外取締役
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表１ アメリカにおける上位252社の会社支配（1980年）
支配者の類型




過半数支配 2 1 4 0 0 7
共同的過半数 0 0 0 1 0 1
安定的少数 10 5 0 1 0 16
限定的小数 16 15 0 0 0 31
共同的少数 1 0 0 1 0 2
未詳の少数 3 1 0 0 0 4
相互会社 - - - - 11 11
利益星座状連関 - - - 154 - 154
不明 - - - - 26 26
合 計 32 22 4 157 37 252





































Employee Retirement Income Security ACT）の制定により，年金基金の管
理・運用の受託責任が問われることになった。受託者責任には，株主総会で
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